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Forward deployment of Navy aircraft carrier battle groups is a primary means for
the United States to achieve overseas interests. The Navy maintains the forward presence
of aircraft carriers in three major Areas of Responsibility (AORs): the Mediterranean Sea,
the Persian Gulf, and the Western Pacific. Considering the cost of carrier operations and
the desire to maximize coverage of the AORs, planning deployments for the carriers not
only significantly affects the achievement of U.S. defense strategy, but also impacts the
Navy financially. Previous studies have maximized the deployment of aircraft carriers to
the AORs while strictly adhering to the fixed, long-range maintenance schedules published
by the Planning and Engineering for Repairs and Alterations Activity for Aircraft Carriers
(PERA CV). This thesis optimizes aircraft carrier deployment planning while shifting the
pre-scheduled maintenance availabilities well within limits allowed by the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO). This synchronous planning of deployments and major maintenance
yields at least 15% more planned coverage in the AORs with the existing carrier fleet.
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Forward deployment of Navy aircraft carrier battle groups and amphibious ready
groups is a primary means for the United States to achieve overseas interests. As
Department of the Navy, Naval Doctrine Publication 1 (NDP 1, 1994) states: "Overseas
presence promotes national influence and access to global areas, builds regional coalitions
and collective security, furthers stability, deters aggression, and provides initial crisis-
response capability.
"
The carrier battle group, operating in international waters, does not need the
permission of host countries for landing or overflight rights, nor to build or maintain bases
in countries in which U.S. presence may cause political or other diplomatic complications.
Aircraft carriers are sovereign U.S. territories that navigate anywhere in international
waters (more than 70% of the earth's surface is ocean). This fact is not overlooked by
those U.S. officials who make political and strategic decisions to use naval aircraft carriers
as a powerful instrument of diplomacy to strengthen alliances and respond to potential and
developing crises. As President Bill Clinton said during a recent visit to the aircraft carrier
USS Theodore Roosevelt, "When word of crisis breaks out in Washington, it's no accident
the first question that comes to everyone's lips is; where is the nearest carrier?"
The Navy attempts to maintain the forward presence of aircraft carriers in three
Areas of Responsibility (AORs): the European Command (EUCOM), the Central
Command (CENTCOM), and Western Pacific (WESPAC). Carriers from the Atlantic
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Fleet (LANTFLT) fulfill forward presence requirements for the EUCOM (Mediterranean
Sea) AOR. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) carriers provide coverage for the CENTCOM
(Persian Gulf) AORs. Occasionally, an Atlantic Fleet carrier will also assist in covering
the Persian GulfAOR. Finally, the carrier operating from Yokosuka, Japan, is responsible
for WESTPAC.
Historically, the Navy has tried to maintain a continuous forward carrier presence
in these principal AORs. The diminishing defense budget has limited the number of
carriers available to meet this goal. Carrier availability is further constrained by scheduled
maintenance, training requirements, and Chief of Naval Operation (CNO) Policy on
Personnel Tempo of Operations (PERSTEMPO). These restrictions along with limited
available assets have made continuous carrier coverage (percentage of time a carrier is
available in an AOR) essentially impossible.
Providing a sufficient amount of coverage in the AORs through forward presence
also helps to decrease crisis response time. Crisis response, the timely dispatch of naval
forces to a specific area, allows the U.S. to render assistance or exert military force.
Herein, crisis response time is defined as the expected time to send the closest carrier to a
crisis location.
A new nuclear powered carrier costs over 3.4 billion dollars, and when deployed is
manned by 3,200 ship's company personnel and 2,480 air wing personnel. The air wing
consists of eight to nine squadrons (85 aircraft). A carrier normally operates as the
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centerpiece of a carrier battle group. A carrier battle group, commanded by a flag officer,
normally consists of two guided missile cruisers, a guided missile destroyer, a destroyer, a
frigate, two attack submarines, and a combined ammunition, oiler, and supply ship.
Considering the cost of carrier operations and the desire to maximize coverage of
the AORs, planning deployments for these carriers not only significantly affects the
achievement of U.S. defense strategy, but also impacts the Navy financially.
Previous studies have maximized the deployment of aircraft carriers to the AORs
while strictly adhering to the fixed, long-range maintenance schedules published by the
Planning and Engineering for Repairs and Alterations Activity for Aircraft Carriers (PERA
CV). However, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) publishes guidelines by which
alterations may be made to a planned maintenance schedule.
This thesis shows that long-term aircraft carrier deployment planning can be
synchronized with long-term scheduled maintenance availabilities, and improved by
shifting maintenance within the limits allowed by CNO guidelines. It also introduces
optimization models to achieve this goal. As a result of improved long-range planning,
AOR coverage achievable with existing carrier force structure is significantly improved,
and average crisis response times by a first and second carrier are significantly shortened.
The synchronous planning of deployments and depot level maintenance creates
new deployable periods and yields at least 15% more planned coverage of the AORs with
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the existing carrier fleet. Such an increase in coverage has heretofore been thought to
require the availability of three additional aircraft carriers.
Moreover, this reasonable planning strategy decreases the average worldwide
crisis response time of a first carrier by an average of about one day and of a second
carrier by about two days. Decreasing crisis response time has both strategic and
economic significance. In the case of the Gulf War of 1990, a delay of two days in crisis
response time by a second carrier has been estimated to increase the price of U.S. oil
imports by an amount between S0.73B and $2.3B. The two-day delay could also result in
a decrease of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product between $13B and $39B.
Considering the strategic and economic significance of efficient planning of aircraft
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1. Forward Presence by Aircraft Carriers
Forward deployment of Navy aircraft carrier battle groups and amphibious ready
groups is a primary means for the United States (U.S.) to achieve overseas interests.
"Overseas presence promotes national influence and access to global areas, builds regional
coalitions and collective security, furthers stability, deters aggression, and provides initial
crisis-response capability." [Department of the Navy 1994, pg. 20]. As U.S. Secretary of
Defense William Cohen stated, "If you don't have that forward deployed presence, you
have less of a voice, less of an influence." [U.S. Navy 1998a]
The carrier battle group, operating in international waters, does not need the
permission of host countries for landing or overflight rights, nor to build or maintain bases
in countries in which U.S. presence may cause political or other diplomatic complications.
Aircraft carriers are sovereign U.S. territories that navigate anywhere in international
waters. This fact is not overlooked by those U.S. officials who make political and strategic
decisions to use naval aircraft carriers as a powerful instrument of diplomacy to strengthen
alliances and respond to potential and developing crises. As President Bill Clinton said
during a visit to the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt, "When word of crisis breaks
out in Washington, it's no accident the first question that comes to everyone's lips is;
where is the nearest carrier?" [U.S. Navy 1998a]
In addition to being able to operate independently, the carrier battle group can also
present a unique range of options to the President, Congress and Secretary of Defense.
By using the oceans (more than 70% of the earth's surface is ocean) both as a means of
geographical access and as a military base, forward-deployed Navy and Marine forces can
be readily available to provide the U.S. with a variety of national response capabilities.
These capabilities range from simply displaying the flag (a demonstration of U.S.
presence) to an assertion of power ashore. The significance of aircraft carriers in terms of
national and international security is highlighted by General John Shalikashvili, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, during a recent visit to the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower: "I
know how relieved I am each time when I turn to my operations officer and say, 'Hey,
where's the nearest carrier?' and he can say to me, 'It's right there on the spot. 1 For United
States' interests, that means everything." [U.S. Navy 1998a]
The Navy attempts to maintain the forward presence of aircraft carriers in three
Areas of Responsibility (AORs): the European Command (EUCOM), the Central
Command (CENTCOM), and Western Pacific (WESTPAC). Carriers from the Atlantic
Fleet (LANTFLT) fulfill forward presence requirements for the EUCOM (Mediterranean
Sea) AOR. Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) carriers provide coverage for the CENTCOM
(Persian Gulf) AORs. Occasionally, an Atlantic Fleet carrier will also assist in covering
the Persian GulfAOR. Finally, the carrier operating from Yokosuka, Japan, is responsible
for WESTPAC.
Historically, the Navy has tried to maintain a continuous forward carrier presence
in these principal AORs. The diminishing defense budget has limited the number of
carriers available to meet this goal. Carrier availability is further constrained by scheduled
maintenance, training requirements, and Chief of Naval Operation (CNO) Policy on
Personnel Tempo of Operations (PERSTEMPO). These restrictions along with limited
available assets have made continuous carrier coverage (percentage of time a carrier is
available in an AOR) essentially impossible.
Providing a sufficient amount of coverage in the AORs through forward presence
also helps to decrease crisis response time. "Crisis response, the emergent, timely
dispatch of naval forces to a specific area, allows the U.S. to render assistance or exert
military force." [Department of the Navy 1994, pg. 20] Herein, crisis response time is
defined as the expected time to send the closest carrier to a crisis location from its planned
position en route to, during, or returning from a planned deployment.
Figure 1. USS Nimitz (CVN 68), launched in 1975, has 3,200 crew in the ship's company
and 2,480 for the air wing. The mission of Nimitz and her embarked air wing is to
conduct sustained combat air operations. The air wing consists of eight to nine squadrons
(85 aircraft). The ship normally operates as the centerpiece of a carrier battle group. The
carrier battle group, commanded by a flag officer, consists of two guided missile cruisers,
a guided missile destroyer, a destroyer, a frigate, two attack submarines, and a combined
ammunition, oiler, and supply ship. [U.S. Navy 1998b]
2. The Significance of Deployment Scheduling of Aircraft Carriers
USS Nimitz (CVN 68) is a nuclear powered aircraft carrier in PACFLT, Figure 1,
now (ca January 1998) operating in the Persian Gulf region. A new nuclear powered
carrier costs over 3.4 billion dollars, and when deployed carries 3,200 crew members in
the ship's company and 2,480 in the air wing. USS Nimitz has two nuclear reactors that
give her virtually unlimited range and endurance and a top speed in excess of 30 knots.
The ship carries approximately 3 million gallons of fuel for her aircraft and escorts, and
enough weapons and stores for extended operations without replenishment. The air wing
consists of eight to nine squadrons (85 aircraft). Attached aircraft are the F/A-18 Hornet,
F-14 Tomcat, EA-6B Prowler, S-3 Viking, E-2 Hawkeye, and SH-60 Seahawk. The air
wing can destroy enemy aircraft, ships, submarines, and land targets, or lay mines
hundreds of miles from the ship. Her aircraft are used to conduct strikes, support land
battles, protect the battle group or other friendly shipping, and implement a sea or air
blockade. The air wing provides a visible presence to demonstrate U.S. power and
resolve in a crisis [US Navy 1998b].
A carrier normally operates as the centerpiece of a carrier battle group. The
carrier battle group, commanded by a flag officer, normally consists of two guided missile
cruisers, a guided missile destroyer, a destroyer, a frigate, two attack submarines, and a
combined ammunition, oiler, and supply ship. [U.S. Navy 1998b]
Considering the cost of carrier operations and the desire to maximize coverage of
the AORs, planning deployments for these carriers not only significantly affects the
achievement of U.S. defense strategy, but also impacts the Navy financially. Inefficient
forward deployment and unnecessary delays of the carriers wastes scarce resources and
degrades combat power.
B. PREVIOUS WORK ON CARRIER FORWARD PRESENCE, COVERAGE,
AND RESPONSE TIMES
A recent study by Brown, et.al [1997] analyzes the role of forward-deployed naval
forces in U.S. national security strategy and joint military strategy. It addresses three
major issues:
• The strategic value of forward-deployed naval forces within a security environment
dominated by diffuse, relatively low-level threats, and within an operational
environment driven by crises that are difficult or impossible to anticipate.
• The economic benefits of forward-deployed naval forces, as illustrated by the impact
of naval crisis response on future oil prices during three recent crises in the Persian
Gulf.
• The effectiveness of naval forces in providing forward presence, as measured by the
amount of coverage or carrier presence in forward areas and by the response times
of carriers to widely dispersed locations throughout the world. [Brown, et.al
1997, pg. i]
Both the strategic and economic advantages of forward-deployed naval forces
depend upon their abilities to provide coverage for the areas of interest and to respond
rapidly when U.S. interests are threatened. The abilities to provide coverage and respond
rapidly are two measures of the level of forward presence which a naval force (particularly
its carrier battle groups), can provide. This reference study developed an optimization-
based model called the Coverage and Response Estimation model, or CoRE, in order to
estimate the level of forward presence sustainable by various number of carriers.
There are several approaches for estimating the level of forward presence. One
approach, e.g., the Navy's Force Presence Model (FPM), involves creating notional
carriers with notional maintenance requirements and calculating average carrier coverage
assuming steady state conditions [OPNAV 1996a]. Figure 2 is extracted from a
memorandum of the Assessment Division Office Chief of Naval Operations (N81)
[OPNAV 1996b] to give some specificity to the nature ofFPM.
TAR
TC
= (TC - DL) / DL => TC = (TAR x DL)+ DL




= 91.25 x [TC - (TC x PERSTEMPO) - DL] / [TC - DL]
= [(TC - DL) x (1 - (OPTEMPO / 91.25))] / TC
= [(23.1 - 6) x (1 - (28/91.25))] / 23.1 = 51.31 %
==> All three CNO PERSTEMPO guidelines are maintained.







= Policy on Personnel Tempo of Operations
= 28 non-deployed days per quarter
Figure 2. Forward Presence Model (FPM). "A Sample Calculation with FPM to Verify
that a TAR of 2.85 Still Meets the CNO's PERSTEMPO Guidelines (maximum
deployment length of 6 months, minimum TAR of 2.0, and minimum PERSTEMPO of
50%). 2.85 is plugged into the tour cycle (TC) and PERSTEMPO equations (other inputs
- deployment length (DL) = 6 months and OPTEMPO = 28 non-deployed days per
quarter)." [OPNAV 1996b]
Another approach [Price, et.al 1996] uses Monte Carlo simulation and Markov
Chain models to estimate response times. These models rely on historical ship
employment data for (probabilistic) input parameters such as length of maintenance and
ship readiness status.
CoRE introduces a number of innovations. CoRE estimates coverage and
response times by deterministically modeling the peacetime deployment of carriers over a
long planning horizon (say, 10 years). It schedules the Navy's actual carriers for
deployment in a manner that optimizes the amount of time that at least one carrier is
present in each forward area in EUCOM and CENTCOM. CoRE also ensures that the
optimal deployment schedules satisfy all operational constraints, such as the scheduled
maintenance availability and PERSTEMPO. The resulting amount of time (or the
corresponding percentage) with at least one carrier present in an AOR provides an
estimate for long-term coverage there. The daily location of each carrier in the optimized
long-range deployment schedule is then computed using a standard transit speed of 14
knots over a network of way points and ship sea-routes. CoRE estimates response times
from the scheduled long-term daily carrier locations to thirty candidate locations
throughout the world. [Brown, et.al 1997]
CoRE has been used to estimate coverage and response times for force structures
with nine to sixteen carriers. It estimates that the current twelve-carrier force can be
expected to achieve approximately 65% and 70% coverage in EUCOM and CENTCOM,
respectively, during the period of 1997 to 2006.
C. A GENERALIZATION TO SCHEDULE MAINTENANCE TOO
To date, CoRE has honored pre-determined, exogenous, fixed scheduled
maintenance periods for each carrier, stipulated by a long-range schedule published by the
Planning and Engineering for Repairs and Alterations Activity for the Aircraft Carriers
(PERA CV). CoRE schedules the Navy's actual carriers for deployment around these
fixed periods of availability in order to maximize the coverage in the AORs.
The Generalized CoRE (GENCoRE) models introduced here maximize the
coverage in the AORs by adhering to all rules stipulated by CoRE, but shifting existing
scheduled maintenance periods within allowable limits.
Figure 3 shows the first five years of a PERA CV maintenance schedule. In
addition, CNO publishes guidelines by which alterations may be made to a planned
maintenance schedule. These rules are summarized in Table 1.
Months from Start of Maintenance Allowable Months Deviation
Cycle to Start of M aintenance Period of Start of M aintenance Period
0-36 mo + /- 3 mo
37-48 mo + /- 4 mo
49-60 mo + /- 5 mo
61-72 mo + /- 6 mo
73-84 mo + /- 7 mo
>84 mo + /- 7 mo
Table 1. CNO Guidelines for Altering Scheduled Maintenance Periods. During a
maintenance cycle, each scheduled maintenance period may be shifted forward, or
backward by a number of months increasing as we progress into the far future. A
maintenance cycle starts after the completion of a carrier's overhaul (or docking
availability, when no overhaul availabilities are included in the maintenance plan) and ends
after completion of the next overhaul or docking availability. For new construction ships,
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Although maintenance periods may be shifted more than one month, we limit our
investigation to one-month shifts. These modest relaxations evaluate sensitivity of











Over a ten-year horizon, at most one maintenance period per carrier may be
shifted one month earlier, or later.
Any maintenance period may be shifted a month.
Only after the first three years, allow at most one maintenance shift of one
month per carrier.
Only after the first three years, allow any maintenance to be shifted one
month.
Table 2. Generalized Core (GENCoRE) Scenarios. Shifting maintenance periods earlier,
or later, relaxes the scheduling problem enough to permit better deployment planning.




H. AIRCRAFT CARRIER DEPLOYMENT SCHEDULING FACTORS AND
OPERATIONS CONSTRAINTS
The deployment scheduling of carriers depends on five factors: (i) depot level
maintenance, (ii) work-up cycle, (iii) PERSTEMPO, (iv) transit time, and (v) availability
ofLANTFLT carriers for CENTCOM. Each of these factors is described below.
A. DEPOT LEVEL MAINTENANCE
Depot level maintenance is defined as "that maintenance which requires skills or
facilities beyond those of the organizational and intermediate levels and is performed by
naval shipyards, naval ship facilities, or item depot activities" [OPNAV 1992]. While at
depots, carriers undergo large-scale maintenance, repairs, approved alterations, and
modifications to update and improve the carrier's technical and military capabilities. Each
carrier periodically requires maintenance of differing durations. In general, these
maintenance periods are for (i) incremental maintenance lasting approximately six months,
(ii) incremental maintenance requiring drydocking, which lasts approximately twelve
months, or (iii) complex overhaul and possibly refueling, with a duration exceeding two
years.
U.S. Navy ships accomplish depot maintenance at the notional intervals,
durations, and repair mandays set forth in OPNAVNOTE 4700 [OPNAV 1996c].
"Interval is defined as the period from the completion of one scheduled depot availability
to the start of the next scheduled depot availability. Duration is defined as the period from
13
the start of an availability to its completion. Repair mandays are those Type Commander
maintenance mandays typically accomplished by the executing activity to satisfactorily
complete the type of availability indicated." [OPNAV 1996c, pg. 3]
A sample notional depot maintenance cycle for a Nimitz Class aircraft carrier is




PSA|-— |SRA|- -|DSRA|- - |SRA| - - |COH|
18 21 39 44.5 62.5 65.5 84 102
PSA : Post Shakedown Availability
SRA : Selected Restricted Availability
DSRA: Docking SRA
COH : Complex Overhaul
Figure 4. Sample Notional Depot Maintenance Availability for a Nimitz Class (CVN 68)
Aircraft Carrier. The dashed time lines indicate periods not in maintenance. The time line
numbers indicate months. A Post Shakedown Availability (PSA) may require only a few
months, while a Complex Overhaul (COH) may take years.
To ensure compatibility between the ship's employment schedules and depot
workloads, CNO authorizes deviation from the notional depot availability interval as
shown in Table 1
.
Figure 5 shows the allowable deviation durations corresponding to the notional
depot maintenance availabilities, provided in Figure 4, for a Nimitz Class (CVN-68)
aircraft carrier.
14




PSA| |SRA| |DSRA| |SRA| |COH|
18 21 39 44.5 62.5 65.5 84 102
Allowable
S^ S^ S^ l-H
Deviation: +/- 3 mo +/- 4 mo +/- 6 mo +/- 7 mo
Figure 5. Allowable Deviations Corresponding to the Notional Depot Maintenance
Availabilities for the Nimitz Class (CVN 68). This maintenance cycle begins at period 0.
Notional start time for the first scheduled maintenance, a Selected Restricted Availability
(SRA), is 18 months from the beginning of the maintenance cycle, and can be shifted
forward or delayed by up to three months.
Depot maintenance of aircraft carriers is conducted at four major repair facilities:
(i) Puget Sound Naval Shipyard (PUGET), (ii) Norfolk Naval Shipyard (NORVA) (Figure
6), (iii) Yokosuka Ship Repair Facility (YOKO), and (iv) Newport News Shipbuilding
Company (NEWS).
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Figure 6. Norfolk Naval Shipyard Aerial View. The NORFOLK NAVAL SHIPYARD in
Portsmouth, Virginia, is one of the largest shipyards in the world specializing in repairing,
overhauling and modernizing ships and submarines. It is the oldest and largest industrial
facility belonging to the U.S. Navy, and is also the most multifaceted. At the extreme left-
center is an empty drydock that can accommodate an aircraft carrier.
Scheduling depot maintenance availabilities for aircraft carriers requires
consideration of four factors: (i) repair requirements for the ship, (ii) forward deployment
requirements by the Navy, (iii) availability of the shipyards, and (iv) capacity of the
shipyards. The limitations associated with shipyard capacity and availability are as
follows:
1. Drydocking Capacity and Availability
PUGET has two drydocks that can handle aircraft carriers. There is one large
drydock for all carriers (nuclear or non-nuclear), and a second slightly smaller one that can
handle only non-nuclear carriers. NORVA has one drydock that can handle either nuclear
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or non-nuclear carriers. NEWS has two drydocks available which can handle any size
carrier. NEWS also has several building docks that are used for carrier construction.
Drydocking can be conducted at any time during a docking availability, and normally
takes one quarter of the total availability period to complete. By coordinating
drydocking schedules, a shipyard may be able to accommodate simultaneous overhauls.
[Brown 1998]
Figure 7 shows the drydocking of USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69) in
NEWS.
Figure 7. Drydocking of USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) at the Newport News
Shipbuilding (NEWS). NEWS is the only private shipyard to perform overhaul and
refueling work on Navy submarines and Nimitz-class aircraft carriers. NEWS completed
the overhaul of Eisenhower in January, 1997, and began a year-long overhaul of USS
Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) in July, 1997. NEWS also performs naval surface
overhauls and repairs.
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2. Repair Manday Availability
Repair mandays are an important secondary consideration when scheduling
maintenance. While there is no limitation on manday availability, excessive manday
requirements are avoided by staggering depot level maintenance periods to minimize
overlaps. Current scheduling practice is to limit the overlap of simultaneous carrier
maintenance periods at a given shipyard to 3 months or less in order to avoid manday
shortfalls. [Brown 1998]
Figure 8 depicts the overlap of maintenance periods in the same shipyard.
CVN 71 5/6/2004 DPIA 3/17/2005
NORVA
CVN 73 9/27/2004 DPIA 8/12/2005
NORVA
DPIA : Docking Planned Incremental Availability
NORVA: Norfolk Naval Shipyard
Figure 8. Overlap ofTwo Carrier Maintenance Periods in the Same Shipyard (taken from
PERA CV schedule data provided in Appendix A). Scheduled DPIA for CVN 71 begins
on May 6, 2004 and ends on March 17, 2005. The DPIA for CVN 73 begins on
September 27, 2004 and ends on August 12, 2005. There is an overlap of approximately
six months which may adversely affect the manday availability in the shipyard.
3. Refueling Availability
Refueling of nuclear-powered carriers must be conducted at NEWS. Due to the budget
constraints, it is preferable to refuel one carrier at a time. However an overlap of at most
six months can be accepted. [Brown 1998]
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B. WORK-UP CYCLE
After depot level maintenance and prior to deployment, all ships are required to
execute the Tactical Training Strategy (TTS) which takes place during the period known
as the work-up cycle. This work-up cycle ensures that the crew is properly trained and
that the ship is ready for deployment.
Conceptually, work-up begins after the completion of maintenance and lasts
approximately 11.5 months. However, recent carrier deployments suggest that
operational exigencies often curtail pre-deployment work-up. Therefore, the GENCoRE
models schedule work-ups according to the following criteria: When the maintenance
period is six months or less, the carrier can deploy fifteen months after the start of
maintenance. If the maintenance period is between six and twelve months, then the carrier
can deploy nineteen months after the start of maintenance. Finally, if the maintenance is a
RCOH, or the carrier has just been commissioned, it cannot deploy for twelve months
after the completion of maintenance or port-shakedown availability. [Brown, et.al 1997,
Pg- 37]
C. PERSONNEL TEMPO OF OPERATIONS (PERSTEMPO)
In order to ensure a balance between the support of national objectives and reasonable
operating conditions for Naval personnel, the CNO initiated the Personnel Tempo of
Operations (PERSTEMPO) program. The PERSTEMPO program achieves this balance
by placing peacetime utilization limitations on all Navy units deployed from their
homeport. There are three utilization limitations:
(1) The maximum length of a deployment cannot exceed six
months (180 days).
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(2) There must be a minimum of a 2-to-l Turn Around
ratio (TAR) between deployments. This means that a carrier
must remain home for at least 12 months following a six-
month deployment.
(3) Over the course of a five-year cycle (three years historical, two
years projected), a carrier must spend a minimum of 50% of its
time in homeport.
A carrier cannot deploy unless it satisfies these PERSTEMPO
restrictions [OPNAV 1990].
A memorandum from N81 concludes that a TAR of 2.61 to 1 is more reasonable
[Brown, et.al 1997, pg. 37].
D. TRANSIT TIME
Per OPNAV guidance, the transit time between San Diego and the Persian Gulf is
45 days [Brown, et.al 1997, pg. 37]. PACFLT carriers from Bremerton or Everett
carriers must transit to San Diego to load the air wing before heading west toward the
Persian Gulf. This adds six days to the transit time in both directions. For LANTFLT
carriers, the transit time from Norfolk or Mayport to EUCOM is 13 days. However, it
takes only eleven days for LANTFLT carriers to return to their homeports.
E. AVAHABILTY OF LANTFLT CARRIERS FOR CENTCOM
LANTFLT carriers can be deployed to CENTCOM to compensate for the loss of
coverage due to the longer transit time required for PACFLT carriers to reach
CENTCOM. A memorandum from N81 establishes that the LANTFLT carriers should
provide 24% ofCENTCOM coverage [Brown, et.al 1997, pg. 37].
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m. MODEL INPUTS AND ASSUMPTIONS
A. SCHEDULE PERIODS







































Figure 9. A Sample Two-year Schedule for Aircraft Carriers. The dark shaded cells
represent time in maintenance. Following each maintenance period is a sequence of light
shaded cells to indicate the required work-up period. Blank cells represent deployable
periods, and vertical striped cells represent non-deployable periods.
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In the GENCoRE models, a carrier is in one of the following states during each
period: (i) maintenance, (ii) work-up, (iii) deployable, or (iv) non-deployable . When the
amount of time between the end of one work-up period and the next maintenance period is
at least 180 days, then a deployment is possible. This block of time is referred to as a
deployable period. If the total number of such intervening available days is less than 180,
it is a non-deployable period.
GENCoRE models use the same carrier availability schedule as CoRE.
OPNAV Report 4710 [1996] provides maintenance schedules for all carriers for parts of
the 1997-2006 period. Information concerning the depot level maintenance from
OPNAVNOTE 4700 [1996] is used to complete the remaining maintenance. This
maintenance information along with the planned decommissioning dates and
commissioning dates are used to determine "open" periods during which carriers are
available for deployment. [Brown, et.al 1997, pg. 35]
The maintenance availability schedule used as an input for the GENCoRE models
is provided in Appendix A.
GENCoRE models have prototypically planned the decade beginning on December
29, 1996 and ending on December 3 1, 2006. This planning horizon has a duration of 523
weeks. A carrier may be scheduled to deploy at the beginning of every four-week interval.
Four-week time resolution makes the scheduling problem computationally tractable, and
offers sufficient fidelity for long-term planning purposes.
B. CARRIER FORCE STRUCTURE
The number of carriers considered here ranges from ten to fourteen. Since there
are currently only twelve carriers, phantom carriers, suggested by Brown, et.al [1997], are
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provided for GENCoRE to augment beyond twelve carriers. The commissioning dates for
the phantom carriers are varied to produce a realistic forecast force with diverse ages and
maintenance requirements. Table 3 shows the commissioning and decommissioning dates
of the real aircraft carriers from 1990 to 2006 along with active service years, and the total
carriers available by fiscal year. The phantom carriers are created to supplement the
carrier force shown in Table 3 by extending actual carriers beyond their decommissioning
dates. Maintenance schedules used for the phantom carriers are based on the notional







Status (as of October 1st ofEach Fiscal Year)
FY90 FY91 FW2 FY93 FY94 FY95 FY96 FY97 FY98 FY99 FY00 FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06
CV59 9/1/93 A A A
CV41 4/11/92 A A
CV43 4/30/90
CV60 8/20/94 A A A A
CV61 7/10/93 A A A
CV62 1/1/59 9/1/98 A A A A A A A A
CV63 4/1/61 A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
CV64 10/1/61 4/1/03 A A A A A A A A A A A A A
CV66 8/9/96 A A A A A A
CV67 1/1/89 A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
CVN65 11/1/61 A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
CVN68 5/1/75 A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
CVN69 10/1/77 A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
CVN70 2/1/82 A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
CVN71 10/1/86 A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
CVN72 12/1/89 A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
CVN73 7/1/92 A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A
CVN74 12/1/95 A A A A A A A A A A A
CVN75 6/1/98 A A A A A A A A A
CVN76 1/1/03 A A A A
Total Number of Carriers 15 15 15 13 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Table 3. Carrier Force. Commissioning and decommissioning dates are shown from
1990 to 2006 along with active service years, and the total carriers available by fiscal year.
Status A represents a carrier in active service.
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During the period 1997-2006, existing carriers will be decommissioned, and
replaced by new construction carriers as they are commissioned. Also, carriers may
change homeports during this period. Thus, when considering a force of a specific size, a
combination of carriers may be considered as one composite carrier. For example, two
different carriers (Independence and Kitty Hawk) are homeported in Yokosuka during
stages of the 1997-2006 decade. Their maintenance availabilities while in Yokosuka are
merged to create the maintenance availabilities of the composite carrier
Independence/Kitty Hawk. The composite carrier force, suggested by Brown et.al [1997],
is used as input by GENCoRE and listed in Appendix B.
"Although the Yokosuka carrier is part ofNavy force structure, OPNAV guidance
indicates that its main responsibility is to cover the Western Pacific" [Brown, et.al 1997,
pg. 37]. Thus, GENCoRE does not schedule the Yokosuka carrier for deployment to
CENTCOM. However, this carrier is considered when calculating response times.
C. CALCULATING COVERAGE PERCENTAGES AND CRISIS RESPONSE
TIMES
Coverage percentage and crisis response time calculations are conducted
according to the following criteria:
1. Coverage Calculation
According to OPNAV guidance, coverage for CENTCOM begins when there is a carrier
within the 960-nautical-mile radius of the Straits of Hormuz. While on-station in
CENTCOM, a carrier is located just inside the Straits at latitude 26.40N and longitude
56.30E. When leaving CENTCOM, the coverage is terminated when the carrier is
outside the 960-nautical-mile radius.
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Under OPNAV guidance, coverage for EUCOM begins when a carrier arrives at
latitude 35.30N and longitude 25.10E, within the vicinity of Iraklion, Crete. When a
LANTFLT carrier transits to CENTCOM, its coverage of EUCOM is temporarily
interrupted while in the Suez Canal, and is terminated when the carrier reaches the 960-
nautical-mile radius of the Straits of Hormouz — the start of its CENTCOM coverage.
Upon returning to Iraklion's vicinity, EUCOM coverage is restored when the carrier is
outside the 960-nautical-mile radius, and temporarily interrupted again during passage
through the Suez Canal. [Brown, et.al 1997, pg. 38]
In both the CoRE and GENCoRE models, when a LANTFLT carrier covers both
EUCOM and CENTCOM in a single deployment, the CENTCOM coverage is assumed to
last six weeks. Both optimization models employ a weighting scheme that accentuates
CENTCOM coverage more than EUCOM so as to generate deployment schedules in
which LANTFLT carriers provide approximately 24% ofCENTCOM coverage.
2. Crisis Response Time Calculation
While a carrier is deployed, its latitude/ longitude locations are computed at the beginning
of each day. These daily latitude/longitude locations are based on port visits and ship
routes constructed from a network of way points and routes developed by analysts at the
Center for Naval Analyses. A transit speed of 14 knots is assumed as indicated by
standard deployment norms.
Response times for deployed carriers are based on the shortest path routes from
these daily latitude/ longitude locations to potential crisis locations (see Appendix C)
using a conservative sprint speed of 20 knots. While on station, the carriers' response
times are computed from their on-station locations.
Except for the Yokosuka carrier, it is assumed (as dictated by OPNAV guidance)
that all carriers in homeport can respond to crises during the last 120 days of their work-
up, and during the first 30 days after return from a deployment. In this situation, the
response time for each potential crisis location includes the length of the shortest path
from homeport, at a sprint speed of 20 knots and a 96-hour recall time. The Yokosuka
carrier is assumed to be able to respond to crises at any time it is not in maintenance. Its
response times are the lengths of the shortest paths from Yokosuka to potential crisis
locations, at a transit speed of 20 knots. [Brown, et.al 1997, pg. 38]
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IV. RELATED LITERATURE, CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK, AND
IMPLEMENTATION
A. OPTIMIZATION LITERATURE
Carrier deployment planning suggests the notorious set-covering or set-
partitioning problem. Many researchers have formulated the scheduling of transportation
vehicles (e.g., delivery trucks, buses, oil tankers and ships) as a set covering or
partitioning problem. Appelgren [1969, 1971] and Crawford and Sinclair [1977] suggest
set-covering or partitioning problem to respectively schedule ships and beer tankers.
Brown, Graves and Ronen [1987] schedule crude oil super tankers using the set
partitioning.
Military applications of set-covering or partitioning include a program called
SURFSKED developed by Wing [1986] to schedule surface combatants for inspections,
training, and other events. Brown, Goodman, and Wood [1990] designed a similar
program called CPSKED to assign combatants to deployments and previously scheduled
naval exercises. Stone [1990] uses set covering to determine the minimum number of
LANTFLT carriers necessary to provide coverage ofthe EUCOM AOR.
Researchers have also scheduled transportation with linear integer programs.
Ronen [1983] and Bodin [1990] (see also references therein) have written two survey
articles discussing various such models and their applications. Sibre's study [1977]
analyzes ship scheduling when the interactions between the schedules are nonlinear.
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Finally, Schauppner [1996] develops a model to schedule PACFLT aircraft carriers
for deployment. Like the set partitioning approach, all possible schedules are generated as
inputs to the optimization solver. However, instead of using an integer program to select
an optimal set of schedules, the problem is formulated as a shortest path network model
with side constraints—an integer linear program. Brown, et.al [1997] use this same
approach in their CoRE model.
GENCoRE models follow Craig [1996] and Brown, et.al [1997] (CoRE),
enhancing the fidelity of CoRE within the limits set by OPNAV guidance. These models
can also be formulated as the set partitions. Appendix E provides a set partitioning
formulation of CoRE. For the base case pursued here, there are 222,293 binary variables
in this set partition. Accordingly, a set partition was not adopted for GENCoRE.
B. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
1. Shifting Maintenance Periods
GENCoRE shifts maintenance availabilities to increase AOR coverage as follows.
Figure 10 depicts a deployment cycle of an aircraft carrier. If we shift the former
maintenance period in Figure 10 one month earlier (to the left), then this maintenance
period will be completed at the end of the second month. Therefore, the work-up period,
and hence the deployable period, will also shift and begin one month earlier. Eventually,
the new deployable period will last for 8 months, beginning in month 15 and ending in
month 22. In addition, we can also increase the deployable period by one month by
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MONTHS





Figure 10. A Deployment Cycle for an Aircraft Carrier. The cycle begins with a
maintenance period of three months, followed by a work-up period of twelve months, and
ends with a deployable period of seven months beginning with month 1 6 and ending in
month 22, after which another maintenance is scheduled.
shifting the later maintenance period (to the right) so that it begins one month later.
Figure 1 1 depicts the effects of such shifting.
r 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1112 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 2122 23 24 25|
•4- ->
I I
Figure 11. Shifting of Maintenance Periods. From Figure 10, the former (left)
maintenance period is shifted one month earlier (to the left), and the second period one
month later (to the right) increasing the length of the deployable period by two months.
Shifting maintenance periods may cause an undesirable overlap. This problem will
arise if we shift one or both of any two maintenance periods towards each other causing
an overlap which exceeds the allowable drydocking, refueling, or manday availability
limits. GENCoRE does not permit any overlap violations. Potentially overlapping
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maintenance periods are called critical maintenance pairs. The maintenance period that
starts earlier is called the first element of the pair, and the other maintenance period is
called the second element of the pair. These labels are assigned in order to simplify the
representation in the formulation. Figure 12 depicts a sample critical maintenance pair.
Carrier A 01/07/97 R C ° H 1/07/98
Carrier B 01/01/97 RCOH 01/01/98
RCOH : Refueling Complex Overhaul
Figure 12. A Sample Critical Maintenance Pair. The overlap between two Refueling
Complex Overhauls (RCOHs) is six months, which is the maximum allowable limit for
refueling nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. If we shift one or both RCOHs towards each
other, then the overlap will exceed this limit. However if we shift them in the same
direction, the overlap will not change and the refueling constraint will not be violated.
The RCOH of Carrier B is the first element of the pair, and the other RCOH is the second
element.
2. Possible Deployment Schedules in a Deployable Period
a. For PACFLT Carriers
If we assume the carrier in Figure 10 to be a PACFLT carrier, then it can
be deployed in only one possible way as shown in Figure 13.
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MONTHS
1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
1
c c c c c c
C: CENTCOM
Figure 13. From Figure 10, a Possible PACFLT Deployment Schedule for a Deployable
Period. The carrier can be deployed to CENTCOM from the beginning of the month 16
to the end of the month 21. The carrier is not deployed in month 22, because there should
be at least a one-month delay between the end of a deployment period and the start of a
maintenance period [Brown, et.al 1997, pg. 59].
After maintenance shifts of Figure 11, we can deploy this carrier in three
alternate ways (Figure 14).
MONTHS
1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
|
SI c c c c c c
S2 c c c c c c
S3 c c c c c c
S : Schedule C : CENTCOM
Figure 14. Alternate Candidate Schedules for the PACFLT Carrier in the Shifted
Deployable Period of Figure 11. S 1 is an early deployment, S2 is a normal deployment,
and S3 is a late deployment.
GENCoRE defines the first deployment schedule (SI) in Figure 14 as an
early deployment. It becomes available by shifting the preceding maintenance period one
month earlier. The second schedule (S2) is called a normal deployment. This deployment
schedule requires no maintenance shifting. The third schedule (S3), a late deployment, is
obtained by shifting the following maintenance period one month later. For the special
case of a seven-month deployable period, obtained by expanding a five-month non-
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deployable period by two months (one month from each end), the result is called an early-
or-late deployment.
If we select an early deployment in an optimized solution, then the
preceding maintenance period must be shifted to begin one month earlier. If a normal
deployment is selected, no change is required. A late deployment requires that the
following maintenance period begin one month later. Finally, if an early-or-late
deployment is selected, both preceding and following maintenance periods must be shifted
away one month.
b. For LANTFLT Carriers
A LANTFLT carrier can deploy to EUCOM for twenty-one weeks, or
alternatively, to EUCOM for 15 weeks and CENTCOM for an additional six weeks.
Figure 15 depicts possible schedules for a sample deployment cycle of a LANTFLT
carrier, and also shows the scheme ofEUCOM and CENTCOM coverage combinations.
(For purposes of illustration using monthly increments, it is assumed in the figure that
CENTCOM coverage is two months instead of six weeks.)
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112 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25|
SI E E E E E E
S2 E C C E E E
S3 E E C C E E
S4 E EEC C E
S : Schedule C : CENTCOM E : EUCOM
Figure 15. Possible Schedules for a Sample Deployment Cycle of a LANTFLT Carrier.
The carrier can be deployed either for six months in EUCOM, or for a combination of two
months ofCENTCOM deployment and four months ofEUCOM deployment.
3. Feasible Combination of Deployment Schedules
After generating all possible deployment schedules, the next step is to find all
feasible combinations of these schedules. The coverage gaps between each pair of
schedules should not exceed a specified length of time which is referred to as max-gap
[Schauppner 1996, pg. 15].
When a feasible combination of schedules is sorted chronologically, every pair of
successive schedules must belong to different deployable periods. If two successive
schedules i andj belong to carriers A and B, respectively, in the same fleet, then carrier A
should depart its homeport before carrier B. This ensures that the two carriers do not
cover an AOR for exactly the same period. Two deployment schedules are said to be
compatible when they satisfy these conditions.
Table 4, Figure 16, and Figure 17 illustrate compatible and incompatible pairs of
deployment schedules. Table 4 shows a sample two-year schedule for four aircraft
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carriers. The first two are PACFLT carriers and the other two are from LANTFLT. The
deployable periods of the carriers in Table 4 are already increased by shifting the
associated maintenance and work-up periods. Figure 16 displays coverage gaps and
overlaps (length of time in which more than one carrier is in an AOR) that will occur in
CENTCOM for each pair of compatible deployment schedules. Figure 17 displays
coverage gaps for EUCOM. For purposes of illustration only, the transit times to and
from CENTCOM are assumed here to be 30 days each for PACFLT carriers. For
LANTFLT carriers, the transit times to and from EUCOM are assumed here to be 15
days. The transit times between CENTCOM and EUCOM are not taken into account
here.
MONTHS AE1 ANJ AN3 AL4 BE1 BL2 CE1 CE2 CE3 CE4 CLJ CL< CL" CL8 DELI DEL2 DEL3 DEL4
2 E E E E
3 c E C E E
4 c c E c c E
5 c c c E E C C
6 c c c c E E E C
7 c c c c E E E E
8 c c c c
9 c c c
10 c c
11 c E E E E
12 E C E E E E E E
13 E c C E E C E E
14 c E E C C E C C E
15 c c E E E C E E C C
16 c c E E E E E E E C









Table 4. A Sample Two-year Schedule for Four Aircraft Carriers. Each row represents a
month, and each column represents a deployment schedule. The first column is labeled
AE1. A represents the carrier, E indicates that the schedule is an early deployment, and 1 is
the schedule number for the carrier in this deployable period. A column label with second
character N, represents a normal deployment, L means a late deployment, and EL an early-
or-late deployment.
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\ E 1 A N 2 AN3 A L 4 BE 1 BL2 CE 1 CE2 CE3 CE4 CL5 CL6 CL7 CL8
AE 1 7 8 4 5 6 S 6 7
AN2 3 4 5 4 5 6
AN3 2 3 4 3 4 5












DEL2 -1 1 2 10 1
1
7 8 9 9 10 1 1
DEL3 -2 -1 1 9 1 6 7 8 8 9 10
DEL4 -3 -2 -1 8 9 5 6 7 7 8 9
Figure 16. Coverage Gaps and Overlaps that Accrue in CENTCOM for Each Pair of
Compatible Deployment Schedules. Each row indicates the first carrier in a pair, and each
column the second. For example, cell (AE1, BE1), has a value of 7: if we first deploy
carrier A with AE1, and then deploy carrier B with BEJ, then there will be a coverage gap
of seven months in CENTCOM, starting from the beginning ofAEJ and ending at the end
ofBEJ. A negative number indicates overlap periods. For example, cell (DEL2, AET)
shows that carriers D and A will cover CENTCOM together for one month. Blank cells
represent incompatible pairs or pairs for which one or both schedules do not provide any
coverage ofCENTCOM.
GENCoRE first calculates overlap values. Then, for the purposes of avoiding
undesired amounts of overlap, the values which are longer than a specific maximum
overlap value are eliminated. The remaining overlap values are assigned to zero, in order
to represent them in terms of coverage gaps.









DELI 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5
DEL2 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7
DELS 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7
DEL4 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7
Figure 17. EUCOM Coverage Gaps for Each Pair of Compatible Deployment Schedules.
Unlike the situation shown in Figure 1 6, there are no overlaps here.
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Note that Figures 16 and 17 are node-node adjacency matrices of a network [e.g.,
Ahuja, Magnanti, and Orlin 1993]. Figure 18 represents the network underlying Figure
17. Nodes SJ and 77 are added to represent the starting and termination of the planning
horizon for EUCOM coverage. The other nodes correspond to deployment schedules for
carriers. Costs associated with arcs originating from node SI and terminating at schedules
DELI to DEL4 correspond to the coverage gap (in months) from the beginning of the
planning horizon to the start ofEUCOM coverage by carrier D. To simplify Figure 18,
arcs from SI to nodes CE1 through CL8 are not shown. Similarly, costs associated with
arcs from schedules CE1 through CL8 to node 77 correspond to the coverage gap evident
from the end of coverage by carrier E to the end of the planning horizon. A network
corresponding to Figure 16 is similarly constructed with nodes S2 and T2 added to


























Figure 18. Network Depicting Possible Sequencing of Deployment Schedules for
EUCOM. SJ is the start node, and Tl the termination node of the network indicating the
beginning and end of the planning horizon, respectively. Any other node in the network
represents a deployment schedule. Each arc length corresponds to the coverage gap
between the two associated deployment schedules. Nodes CE3, CE4, CL5, and CL6
exist, but are not displayed in the figure.
For each of the two networks (one for CENTCOM and one for EUCOM)
described above, we can derive feasible paths beginning with SI or S2, visiting at most one
node (or schedule) in each deployable period, and ending with 77 or T2. Figure 19
depicts two sample feasible paths, one derived from the CENTCOM network, and the
other from the EUCOM network. Since a LANTFLT carrier can cover both CENTCOM
and EUCOM in the same deployment schedule, a feasible path from the CENTCOM
network may have common nodes with another feasible path from the EUCOM network.
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EUCQM : Total Gap = 14 months
Q " ^© " *(3 ~~ ^©
CENTCOM : Total Gap =14 months
S3, 1 ^ i ^ 2 — 5(^) " (=*) ^K^
Figure 19. Two Sample Feasible Paths: One Derived from the EUCOM Network, and
the Other from the CENTCOM Network. Node CE2 is common to both paths, meaning
that LANTFLT carrier covers both EUCOM and CENTCOM in the same schedule.
At this point, the carrier deployment problem is reduced to finding two paths t it
satisfy the conditions discussed above, and that yield a minimum gap. GENCoRE models
this as a two-commodity network flow problem with side constraints.
C. IMPLEMENTATION
GENCoRE consists of the following three processes: (i) Schedule Generator
(generates all possible deployment schedules and their feasible combinations), (ii) Solver
(determines the optimal deployment schedules that maximize coverage in the AORs by
solving a shortest path network problem using Integer Linear Programming), (iii)
Coverage Percentage and Crisis Response Time Calculator (calculates the optimal
coverage percentages and crisis response times using the advice of the solver).
1. Schedule Generator
The networks described above are constructed in the schedule generator. Possible
deployment schedules are generated to construct the nodes of the networks. Each feasible
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pairwise combination is enumerated to construct an arc, and the coverage gap for each
such feasible combination is calculated as the length of that arc. The generator also
classifies each schedule in order to determine its deployable period, type (e.g., early, or
late), and AOR (i.e. CENTCOM, EUCOM, or both). This is implemented in a Fortran
program.
The generator automates the complicated calculations, provides a formatted input
for the solver, and hence shortens scheduling time. Because we only generate possible
schedules and their feasible combinations, the number of variables and constraints is
minimized.
GENCoRE variants differ in some details. Shift-Once and Shift-All scenarios
increase all the deployable and non-deployable periods by two months to allow shifting,
and Shift-Once-in-Future and Shift-All-in-Future scenarios increase only the deployable
and non- deployable periods existing after the first three years (see Table 2 GENCoRE
Scenarios).
Table 5 shows the number of schedules and deployable periods generated by
CoRE and by each of the GENCoRE variants for a force of twelve carriers in a base case.











Table 5. The Number of Nodes and Deployable Periods Generated by CoRE and
GENCoRE for a Base Case Force of Twelve Carriers. There is a slight increase in the
number of deployable periods between CoRE and GENCoRE because some new
deployable periods resultfrom shifting maintenance periods.
2. Optimization Model
The two-commodity network problem with side constraints is mathematically
formulated as follows:





AORs (EUCOM and CENTCOM)
carriers
deployable periods (1,2,...,D-\,D)
nodes in the networks representing the schedules (Nodes 5° and V represent
the beginning and the end of the planning horizon, respectively)
drydocking or refueling shipyards (Newport News, Puget Sound, and Norfolk)
critical maintenance period pairs (i.e. maintenance periods which will overlap
more than the allowable drydocking, refueling, or manday availability limits
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c: carrier c can cover AOR a}
i: schedule i belongs to deployable period d of carrier c]
i: schedule /' belongs to early or late deployments of period d of carrier c)
i: schedule i covers both AORs}
/': schedule i belongs to early deployments of the deployable period right
after the second element of critical maintenance period pair p ( i.e. the
maintenance period which starts later) for shipyard s }
LI = {/: schedule /' belongs to late deployments of the deployable period right
before the first element of critical maintenance period pair/? ( i.e. the
maintenance period which starts earlier) for shipyard s }
Data:
GAP' gap length in AOR a if nodey" follows node / in a path
EXIST" equals 1 if there is an arc from node /' to node/' for AOR a
WEIGHT weight for coverage gap in AOR a (e.g., a CENTCOM weight of
3, and a EUCOM weight of 1)




equal 1 if arc (ij) belongs to the path from S° to T and otherwise
Formulation
minimize Y WEIGHT" Y GAP" * x° + Y CONST * xajL-i . jL-i .<J 'J
(
L-i >J
















J[i.7):ieIf.£»5Tj , =l) fci.;):isEf .£*KJ£=l}
V a, s, and /? (1.4)
Va,ceO' (1.5)
In the above formulation, the objective is to minimize the weighted coverage
gaps in CENTCOM and EUCOM with a very small penalty assessed to the shifted
maintenance schedules. Constraint (1.1), a flow balance constraint, ensures that there is a
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continuity of flow into and out of each node, and thus a path from S3 to T . Constraint
(1.2) ensures that at most one schedule is selected from each deployable period.
Constraint (1.3) ensures that the same schedule is selected, if it covers both AORs.
Constraint (1.4) ensures that neither the drydocking, manday, nor refueling capacity of
shipyard s is exceeded. Constraint (1.5) ensures that carrier c will depart its shipyard at
most one month early, or one month late.
b. Formulationfor Shift-All and Shift-All-in-Future Scenarios
Indices:
a AORs (EUCOM and CENTCOM)
c carriers
d deployable periods (1, 2, . .
.
, D- 1, D)
i,j nodes in the networks representing the schedules (Nodes 6° and T represent
the beginning and the end of the planning horizon, respectively)
s drydocking or refueling shipyards (Newport News, Puget Sound, and Norfolk)
p critical maintenance period pairs (i.e. maintenance periods which will overlap
more than the allowable drydocking, refueling, or manday availability limits
when shifted towards each other)
Index Maps:
O a = {c: carrier c can cover AOR a]
Of
c
= {/': schedule /' belongs to deployable period d of carrier c)
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0f ={/': schedule / belongs to early deployments of period d of carrier c)
A^ = {/: schedule /' belongs to late deployments of period dot carrier c)
T = {/': schedule i covers both AORs}
Ac = {d: period d of carrier c is obtained as deployable by shifting maintenance
periods}
Ef = {/': schedule / belongs to early deployments of the deployable period right
after the second element of critical maintenance period pair p ( i.e. the
maintenance period which starts later) for shipyard s }
LF
S
= {/: schedule i belongs to late deployments of the deployable period right
before the first element of critical maintenance period pair/? ( i.e. the
maintenance period which starts earlier) for shipyard s }
Data:
GAP° gap length in AOR a if nodey' follows node /' in a path
EXIST" equals 1 if there is an arc from node / to nodey for AOR a
WEIGHT" weight for coverage gap in AOR a (e.g., a CENTCOM weight of
3, and a EUCOM weight of 1)




equal 1 if arc (ij) belongs to the path from S° to T and otherwise
Formulation
minimize V WEIGHT Y GAP* * x* + Y CONST * x„fl
a {Ci,j):BK7S7^=l| {(a,c,rf,;,7):c€<D a ,is(eforAf),HJ57;J1 =l)
subject to
2X- 2X=





V a, d, and ce$" (2.2)










V a, s, and /? (2.4)
Va, rfe{l,...,D-l}, andc e O" (2.5)
i
2^ + 2X ^ V a, d<=(A
c
and {2,...,D}), and c e <X>* (2.6)
V a, rfe(A c and {1,...,D-1}), and ce$a (2.7)
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In the above formulation, the objective is to minimize the weighted coverage
gaps in CENTCOM and EUCOM with a very small penalty assessed to the shifted
maintenance schedules. Constraint (2.1), a flow balance constraint, ensures that there is a
path from S" to T. Constraint (2.2) ensures that at most one schedule is selected from
each deployable period. Constraint (2.3) ensures that the same schedule is selected, if it
covers both AORs. Constraint (2.4) ensures that the drydocking or refueling capacity of
shipyard s is not exceeded. Constraint (2.5) ensures that a maintenance period is shifted in
one direction only (i.e. a maintenance period cannot start one month late and
simultaneously end one month early).
Constraint (2.6) ensures that a carrier cannot be deployed in deployable
period d that was obtained from a non-deployable period, and at the same time deployed
in a late deployment schedule of period (d-\). Constraint (2.7) ensures that a carrier
cannot simultaneously be deployed in deployable period d that was obtained from a non-
deployable period, and in an early deployment schedule of period (^+1). If we deploy a
carrier in a late deployment schedule of period (d-l), then this will preclude deployment in
period d. Therefore, a late deployment in (d-l) is mutually exclusive with any deployment
\nd.
3. Solver
The models have been implemented with the algebraic modeling language GAMS
[Brooke, et.al 1992] and solved with OSL [IBM, 1992] using a 133 Mhz and 80MB
Pentium personnel computer. Table 6 gives the model sizes resulting from GENCoRE
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scenarios. The optimality tolerance has been set to one percent. The solution times range
from 45 minutes to 65 minutes.






































Table 6. Model Sizes for a Force of Twelve Carriers, A Planning Horizon of Ten years,
and a Time Resolution of One Month. A number in parenthesis indicates the constraint
number in the mathematical formulation. For example, there are 1600 constraints for
equation type (1. 1) in the Shift-Once scenario.
4. Coverage Percentage and Crisis Response Time Calculator
There are two Fortran programs that use the solver output to respectively
calculate average crisis response times and coverage percentages as described in Chapter
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IE. Figure 20 shows a sample output for a ten-year schedule generated by Shift-Once-in-
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This chapter presents achievable estimated coverage and response times derived
from the following models: (i) Modified CoRE (a modification of the input data and the
CoRE model generator, preserving the fidelity of the original model but repairing some
errors and producing more accurate results), and (ii) GENCoRE.
Following recent exigent events in the Persian Gulf, the above models are also
compared with a new scenario which allows Persian Gulf deployment by LANTFLT
carriers to last either 4, 8, 12, or 16 weeks instead of fixing the length of these
deployments at six weeks (Vary-Gulf). Unlike Modified CoRE and GENCoRE,
CENTCOM and EUCOM are weighted equally in this scenario.
For the purposes of model validation, a statistical analysis is presented in Appendix
D that seeks a relationship between shifting maintenance periods and the resulting planned
duration of the following work-up period. The key idea is to see if shifting maintenance to
make deployments more flexible comes at the cost of curtailed or hastened work-ups.
A. MODIFIED CORE - REPAIRS TO THE ORIGINAL MODEL
In the course of this research, we have discovered a few details in the original
CoRE implementation that have needed to be changed. The result, called Modified CoRE
here, has all these necessary repairs and may not exactly corroborate the base case results
in Brown, et.al [1997].
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A Refueling Complex Overhaul (RCOH) scheduled for USS Nimitz to end on 30
March, 2001, was found to be coded in the CoRE generator to end a year earlier. This
one-year error is a relaxation that affects the results significantly.
A logic error in the CoRE generator did not require carriers with pre-scheduled
work-up periods to return from deployment a month before their next scheduled
maintenance. This relaxes the intended scheduling problem by four weeks and thus
creates extra deployable periods. However, there were only five instances of this
condition in the CoRE base case scenario, and not all of these were exploited in any
optimized plan.
The 12-carrier scenario of Brown, et.al [1997] uses USS Phantom E to substitute
for USS Truman and maintain the total planned force of twelve carriers. However, the
last deployable period of Phantom E overlapped the first o JSS Truman, relaxing the
scenario briefly to thirteen carriers. This triviality is repaired by removing USS Phantom E
from the fleet just as USS Truman arrives.
The nature of these repairs renders Modified CoRE as a restriction of CoRE.
B. AOR COVERAGE PERCENTAGES




CARRIERS EUCOM CENTCOM BY LANTFLT BY PACFLT
10 48.86 53.38 35.14 64.86
11 50.29 64.35 24.64 75.36
12 59,53 67.33 28.38 71.62
13 61.34 71.87 26.63 73.37
14 67.17 72.83 26.15 73.85
Table 7. AOR Coverage with Modified CoRE. The results shown include AOR
coverage percentages, and distribution of CENTCOM coverage between LANTFLT and
PACFLT carriers. For example, with a force of twelve carriers, coverage in EUCOM is
59.53% and coverage in CENTCOM is 67.33%. CENTCOM is covered by LANTFLT
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Figure 21. AOR Coverage with Modified CoRE. As the number of carriers increases,
the coverage of both AORs also increases. The deployment of the eleventh carrier in
PACFLT, results in a significant increase in CENTCOM coverage. Likewise, a significant
increase in EUCOM coverage is due to the addition of the twelfth carrier to LANTFLT.
NO. CENTCOM CENTCOM
CARRIERS EUCOM CENTCOM BY LANTFLT BY PACFLT
10 60.85 64.43 33.86 66.14
11 62.44 74.75 25.64 74.36
12 73.24 79.64 30.83 69.17
13 76.28 82.11 25.82 74.18
14 82.93 84.98 27.35 72.65
Table 8. AOR Coverage with GENCoRE-Shift-Once. This scenario allows
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Figure 22. AOR Coverage with GENCoRE-Shift-Once.
NO. CENTCOM CENTCOM
CARRIERS EUCOM CENTCOM BYLANTFLT BY PACFLT
10 63.61 67.72 35.32 64.48
11 62.52 80.38 29.54 70.46
12 75.98 83.97 32.52 67.48
13 78.44 87.11 27.23 72.77
14 82.19 89.82 30.54 69.46
Table 9. AOR Coverage with GENCoRE-Shift-All. This scenario allows an unlimited
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Figure 23. AOR Coverage with GENCoRE-Shift-All. Although the number of carriers
increases from ten to eleven, the coverage percentage in EUCOM decreases by a small
amount. This decrease follows the deployment of the eleventh carrier in PACFLT, and
reflects the difference of the weights used for CENTCOM and EUCOM (CENTCOM
coverage is three times more weighted than EUCOM coverage).
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NO. CENTCOM CENTCOM
CARRIERS EUCOM CENTCOM BY LANTFLT BY PACFLT
10 60.90 62.11 35.13 64.87
11 63.20 72.26 26.41 73.59
12 73.46 77.35 31.77 68.23
13 75.10 79.84 28.79 71.21
14 81.50 83.15 31.75 68.25
Table 10. AOR Coverage with GENCoRE-Shift-Once-in-Future. This scenario allows a
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Figure 24. AOR Coverage with GENCoRE-Shift-Once-in-Future.
NO. CENTCOM CENTCOM
CARRIERS EUCOM CENTCOM BY LANTFLT BY PACFLT
10 60.19 63.64 35.49 64.51
11 60.19 76.11 29.15 70.85
12 72.83 79.51 32.26 67.74
13 75.70 81.92 25.77 74.23
14 83.80 84.40 28.57 71.43
Table 11. AOR Coverage with GENCoRE-Shift-All-in-Future. This scenario allows an
unlimited number of maintenance period shifts per carrier by one month, beginning with
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Figure 25. AOR Coverage with GENCoRE-Shift-All-in-Future.
Shift-Once-in-Future and Shift-All-in-Future scenarios are motivated by the
realistic expectation that shifting of maintenance periods during the first three years of the
planning horizon may complicate the coordination of deployment and maintenance
scheduling.
NO. CENTCOM CENTCOM
CARRIERS EUCOM CENTCOM BY LANTFLT BY PACFLT
10 44.38 58.25 41.26 58.74
11 49.82 65.01 30.22 69.78
12 60.77 67.33 28.04 71.96
13 63.94 67.58 24.51 75.49
14 73.84 72.12 26.59 73.41
Table 12. AOR Coverage with Vary-Gulf. This Modified CoRE scenario allows
CENTCOM (Persian Gulf) deployment by LANTFLT carriers to last either 4, 8, 12, or
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Figure 26. AOR Coverage with Vary-Gulf. For the fourteen carrier force, the EUCOM
coverage is more than the CENTCOM coverage.







IModified CoRE Shift-Once EJShift-All EShift-0 nce-in-Future Shift-All-in-Future QVary-Gulf
Figure 27. AOR Coverage for EUCOM. The legends are ordered from left to right. On
average the best results are achieved with Shift-All. GENCoRE scenarios yield
significantly better results than Modified CoRE. Modified CoRE and Vary-Gulf scenarios
do not shift scheduled maintenance, and have approximately the same coverage.
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Number of Carriers
IModified CoRE Shift-Once E3 Shift-All Shift-Once-in-Future Shift-All-in-Future OVary-Gulf
Figure 28. AOR Coverage for CENTCOM. The legends are ordered from left to right.
GENCoRE scenarios yield significantly better results than Modified CoRE. Modified
CoRE and Vary-Gulf do not shift scheduled maintenance, and yield approximately the
same coverage.
The coverage percentages derived from GENCoRE for both AORs are
significantly higher than those of Modified CoRE. For the most conservative Shift-Once-
in-Future scenario, the coverage in CENTCOM with twelve carriers is 77.35% and the
coverage in EUCOM 73.46%. For the Modified CoRE scenario, these percentages are
67.33% and 59.53%, respectively. This corresponds to a 10.02% of increase in
CENTCOM, and a 13.93% increase in EUCOM. Significantly higher coverage
percentages are achieved with just twelve carriers in Shift-Once-in-Future as compared to
those coverage percentages yielded by the fourteen carrier Modified CoRE scenario.
Moreover, Shift-All yields even better results with only eleven carriers.
The significant improvements in coverage derive from the new deployable periods
obtained by shifting maintenance periods. Table 5 in Chapter IV shows that by shifting the
maintenance periods one month earlier or later, we obtain nine new deployable periods.
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These nine new deployable periods allow 116 more weeks of planned coverage in the
AORs.
Vary-Gulf differs from Modified CoRE by allowing CENTCOM (Persian Gulf)
deployment of a LANTFLT carrier to last either 4, 8, 12, or 16 weeks instead of fixing the
length of deployment at six weeks. Like Modified CoRE, Vary-Gulf does not shift
maintenance periods. Variable-length Persian Gulf coverage by a LANTFLT carrier is a
relaxation, and might be expected to increase coverage percentages. However, Figures 26
and 27 show that Modified CoRE and Vary-Gulf scenarios yield approximately the same
coverage percentages. Therefore, in order to reduce the size of each model (CoRE and
GENCoRE) and to make larger scale future versions (e.g., allowing shifts more than one
month) of these scenarios solvable, it is reasonable to fix the Persian Gulf deployment of a
LANTFLT carrier at six weeks.
C. CRISIS RESPONSE TIMES
Table 13 and Figure 29 show the average crisis response times of the first carrier,
derived from Modified CoRE and Shift-Once-in-Future scenarios with the existing carrier
fleet. The locations shown are a representative sample from around the world (see
Appendix C for the latitudes and longitudes of these points). These geographical locations
are not meant to forecast a particular crisis during the 1997-2006 planning horizon, but
rather to gauge the ability to reach diverse destinations when an optimally scheduled
deployment plan is interrupted by a need for crisis response.
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Geographical Modified Shift-Once-in- Difference in the
No. Locations CoRE Future Response Times
1 Adriatic 4.1 2.5 1.6
2 Algiers 5.2 3.9 1.3
3 Baltic 7.1 6.1 1.0
4 Bugo, Philippines 6.4 5.7 0.7
5 Colombo 5.7 4.7 1.0
6 Dacca, Bangladesh 7.4 6.6 0.8
7 Djibouti 4.6 3.4 1.2
8 Ecuador 14.5 14.1 0.4
9 El Salvador 13.2 12.9 0.3
10 French Guyana 9.2 8.7 0.5
11 Haiti 7.8 6.5 1.3
12 Hong Kong 6.2 5.5 0.7
13 Iceland 8.3 7.5 0.8
14 Jakarta 7.3 6.5 0.8
15 Karachi 4.4 3.1 1.3
16 Korea 5.2 4.7 0.5
17 Kuwait 4.1 2.7 1.4
18 Lebanon 3.7 2.1 1.6
19 Liberia 9.4 8.5 0.9
20 Luanda 12.4 11.8 0.6
21 Madagascar 5.7 4.9 0.8
22 Malacca 6.9 6.1 0.8
23 Mombasa, Kenya 6.9 5.8 1.1
24 Montevideo, Uruguay 14.5 14.1 0.4
25 Sakhalin, Russia 7.5 7.2 0.3
26 Santiago, Chile 16.8 16.4 0.4
27 Somalia 6.2 5.1 1.1
28 Spratley Islands 6.4 5.7 0.7
29 Taiwan Strait 5.6 5.0 0.6
30 Tripoli 3.7 2.1 1.6
Average 7.5 6.7 0.9
Table 13. Average Crisis Response Times (in days) of a First Carrier to World-wide
Locations. Shift-Once-in-Future yields an average decrease of nearly a full day
(numerically, the difference is 0.88, shown above truncated to 0.9) in the crisis response
times of the first carrier.
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Geographical Locations
@ Modified CoRE B Shift-Once-in-Future
Figure 29. Comparison of the Average Crisis Response Times (in days) of a First Carrier
Between Modified CoRE and Shift-Once-in-Future. For all geographical locations Shift-
Once-in-Future yields faster crisis response.
Table 14 and Figure 30 show the average crisis response times of a second carrier,
derived from Modified CoRE and Shift-Once-in-Future scenarios.
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Geographical Modified Shift-Once- Difference in the
No. Locations CoRE in-Future Response Times
1 Adriatic 12.5 9.5 3.0
2 Algiers 12.5 9.8 2.7
3 Baltic 13.9 10.1 3.8
4 Bugo, Philippines 12.4 11.3 1.1
5 Colombo 10.9 8.7 2.2
6 Dacca, Bangladesh 11.9 9.8 2.1
7 Djibouti 10.4 7.4 3.0
8 Ecuador 19.3 18.7 0.6
9 El Salvador 19.0 18.2 0.8
10 French Guyana 14.1 11.0 3.1
11 Haiti 15.4 11.7 3.7
12 Hong Kong 12.5 11.3 1.2
13 Iceland 14.2 11.0 3.2
14 Jakarta 11.4 9.7 1.7
15 Karachi 11.5 8.8 2.7
16 Korea 13.3 12.5 0.8
17 Kuwait 12.6 9.9 2.7
18 Lebanon 11.9 8.9 3.0
19 Liberia 15.0 12.6 2.4
20 Luanda 16.0 14.3 1.7
21 Madagascar 9.8 7.5 2.3
22 Malacca 10.8 9.1 1.7
23 Mombasa, Kenya 12.6 9.8 2.8
24 Montevideo, Uruguay 17.0 16.1 0.9
25 Sakhalin, Russia 16.0 15.2 0.8
26 Santiago, Chile 19.4 19.2 0.2
27 Somalia 11.9 9.1 2.8
28 Spratley Islands 11.5 10.0 1.5
29 Taiwan Strait 12.6 11.6 1.0
30 Tripoli 12.1 9.1 3.0
Average 13.5 11.4 2.1
Table 14. Average Crisis Response Times (in days) of a Second Carrier to World-wide
Locations. Shift-Once-in-Future yields an average decrease of 2. 1 days in the crisis
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Figure 30. Comparison of the Average Crisis Response Times (in days) of the Second
Carrier Between Modified CoRE and Shift-Once-in-Future. For all geographical locations
Shift-Once-in-Future yields significantly faster crisis response.
When compared to Modified CoRE, the most conservative GENCoRE scenario,
Shift-Once-in-Future yields an average decrease of nearly a full day in the crisis




VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This thesis shows that long-term aircraft carrier deployment planning can be
synchronized with long-term maintenance availabilities and improved by shifting
maintenance within limits allowed by CNO when necessary. As a result of improved long-
range planning, AOR coverage achievable with existing force structure is significantly
improved and average crisis response times by a first and second carrier are significantly
shortened.
The synchronous planning of deployments and depot level maintenance yields at
least 15% more AOR coverage than can be achieved with the current base case. Such an
increase in coverage has heretofore been thought to require the availability of three
additional aircraft carriers.
Moreover, this reasonable planning strategy decreases the estimated average
worldwide crisis response time of a first carrier by an average of about one day and of a
second carrier by about two days. Decreasing crisis response time has both strategic and
economic significance. In the case of the GulfWar of 1990, a delay of two days in crisis
response time by a second carrier has been estimated by Brown, et.al [1992, pg. 50] to
increase the price ofU.S. oil imports by an amount between $0.73B and $2.3B. The two-
day delay could also result in a decrease of the U.S. Gross Domestic Product between
$13B and $39B.
Synchronous long-term planning of deployments and depot level maintenance has
been limited here to investigating improvement in coverage percentages and crisis
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response times by shifting the maintenance periods only one month. Clearly, more
aggressive shifting may be of interest, although the limits allowed by CNO [OPNAV
1996c, pg. 3-4] may need further clarification before they are approved for automated
planning use.
The previously mentioned differences in AOR coverage and response times
achievable with the synchronous planning could certainly decrease over time as the
baseline schedule is changed or updated to eliminate inefficiencies. Such potentially
disruptive changes would be prevented through the use of synchronous scheduling as a
long-term planning tool. Long-range maintenance and deployment schedules would be
better defined, thus reducing volatility in both areas.
In an era in which the U.S. Navy must accomplish more with fewer resources, any
planning tool that improves operational efficiency while simultaneously enabling better
control of long-range maintenance requirements merits serious consideration.
Although not investigated in this thesis, there would seem to be potential savings
available from improved long-range maintenance schedules. Material requirements and
shipyard workloads could be forecast more reliably and better managed. In addition to
improving efficiency at the maintenance and deployment scheduling levels, such a planning
tool can offer valuable insight to budget analysts at the level of the Department of the
Navy. Tradeoffs between costly maintenance requirements (such as RCOH) and the
acquisition of additional force structures or improved readiness are constantly being
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considered. A planning tool that helps to quantify the impact of shifting carrier
maintenance schedules necessitated by budgetary constraints would surely help senior
Navy decision makers make more informed decisions and to prepare more persuasive
requests for additional funding from the Office of the Secretary ofDefense (OSD).
Allowing shifts of more than one month will increase the size of the resulting
optimization models, as would a longer planning horizon. If these larger models cannot be
solved directly, and if the effort is justified by the potential value of the results, more
advanced solution methods may deserve attention.
GENCoRE can be embellished to consider posed crises — future epochs of
increased coverage demands on carriers. One can also explicitly evaluate changes in
PERSTEMPO policies, and many other OPNAV policies that directly influence AOR
coverage and crisis response times achievable by one of the planned carrier fleet.
Considering the strategic and economic significance of efficient planning of aircraft
carrier fleet deployment, the decision-support optimization models introduced here have
much to recommend then.
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APPENDIX A. MAINTENANCE PERIODS FOR CARRIERS
AS OF FEBRUARY 28, 1997





















































PACIFIC FLEET (Cont) Start Finish Maintenance
Reagan (CVN-76)
Bremerton/Everett
Phantom A (CVN 69.5)
San Diego
Commission 1980






















DPIA Drydocking Planned Incremental Availability
DSRA Drydocking Selected Restricted Availability
EDSRA Extended Drydocking Selected Restricted Availability
ESRA Extended Selected Restricted Availability
ISRA Incremental Selected Restricted Availability
PIA Planned Incremental Availability
PSA Post Shakedown Availability
RCOH Refueling Complex Overhaul
SRA Selected Restricted Availability
*Note about Constellation and Kitty Hawk going to Yokosuka
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ATLANTIC FLEET (Cont) Start Finish Maintenance
















DPIA Drydocking Planned Incremental Availability
DSRA Drydocking Selected Restricted Availability
EDSRA Extended Drydocking Selected Restricted Availability
ESRA Extended Selected Restricted Availability
ISRA Incremental Selected Restricted Availability
PIA Planned Incremental Availability
PSA Post Shakedown Availability
RCOH Refueling Complex Overhaul
SRA Selected Restricted Availability
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APPENDIX B. BASE CASE FLEET COMPOSITION
Fleet Size
16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7
PACIFIC FLEET
Constellation/Stennis Y Y Y Y Y Y
Kitty Hawk/Reagan Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Independence/Constellation/Kitty Hawk Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Nimitz Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Vinson Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lincoln Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Phantom A Y Y Y Y
Phantom C Y Y
ATLANTIC FLEET
Enterprise Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Kennedy Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Eisenhower Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Roosevelt Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Washington Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Phantom E/Truman Y Y Y Y Y









Bugo, Philippines 05.45N 128.42E
Colombo 06.57N 079.49E
Dacca, Bangladesh 2LOON 090.00E
Djibouti 11.36N 043.09E
Ecuador 05.15S 082.00W
El Salvador 06.45N 084. 19W
French Ghiana 05.00N 049.30W
Haiti 18.33N 072.24W








Luanda 08.45S 013. 14E
Madagascar 18.09S 049.25E
Malacca 02.18N 101. 18E
Mombasa, Kenya 04.04S 039.40E
Montevideo, Uruguay 34.54S 056. 16W
Sakhalin, Russia 50.00N 143.00E
Santiago, Chile 34.45S 074.00W
Somalia 02.0IN 045. 19E
Spratley Islands 10.00N 111.30E




APPENDIX D. ANALYSIS OF THE PLANNED TIMES BETWEEN THE END
OF A MAINTENANCE AND THE START OF THE NEXT DEPLOYMENT
A. DOES OPTIMAL DEPLOYMENT CHANGE THE RESULTING
DURATION OF WORK-UP PERIODS?
Although GENCoRE plans deployment cycles following all guidance for minimum
work-up durations, there may be some concern that in pursuit of optimized long-term
deployment plans, we tend to shave these work-ups to the minimum allowable duration.
In order to assess whether such suspicion is warranted, we treat the various
models for prescribing planned deployments as a series of experimental treatments, with
the resulting work-up durations pooled for each model as a statistically random sample.
B. A FIRST LOOK AT THE DATA
Table D.l and Figures D.l through D.5 provide a statistical summary of the
resulting times between the end of a maintenance and the start of the next planned
deployment (the resulting durations allowable for work-ups), derived from Modified
CoRE and GENCoRE base case deployment plans.
No. of Minimum First Median Mean Third Maximum Std.
Models Work- Months Quartile Months Months Quartile Months Variance Dev.
ups Durations Durations Durations Durations
Modified CoRE 34 8.4 10.3 11.0 11.8 13.6 20.1 6.5 2.5
Shift-Once 41 8.4 10.0 11.4 11.6 12.1 21.0 6.9 2.6
Shift-All 42 7.0 9.6 11.1 11.5 12.8 22.9 8.7 3.0
Shift-Once-in-Future 40 8.4 9.7 11.3 11.5 12.3 20.1 6.4 2.5
Shift-All-in-Future 40 7.0 9.1 11.3 11.5 12.8 20.1 7.4 2.7
Table D.l. Statistical Summary of Work-Up Period Durations Resulting from Modified CoRE
and GENCoRE Base Case Deployment Plans. Observed time units are in months. 25% of the
data lie below the first quartile, and 75% of the data lie above it. 25% of the data lie above third
quartile, and 75% lie below it.
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Figure D.l Histogram of the Durations of Modified CoRE Work-Up Periods. The
horizontal axis denotes the resulting times (in months) between the end of a maintenance
and the start of the next planned deployment for the Modified CoRE. The vertical axis
denotes the number of observations in each interval. For instance, the leftmost bar shows
that there are seven work-up periods lasting from 8 to 10 months.
Figure D.2 Histogram of the Durations of Shift-Once Work-Up Periods. The horizontal
axis denotes the resulting times (in months) between the end of a maintenance and the
start of the next planned deployment for Shift-Once. The vertical axis denotes the number
of observations in each interval. For instance, the leftmost bar shows that there are eight
work-up periods lasting from 8 to 10 months.
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Figure D.3 Histogram of the Durations of Shift-All Work-Up Periods. The horizontal
axis denotes the resulting times (in months) between the end of a maintenance and the
start of the next planned deployment for Shift-All. The vertical axis denotes the number of
observations in each interval. For instance, the leftmost bar shows that there are two
work-up periods lasting from 7 to 8 months.
Figure D.4 Histogram of the Durations of Shift-Once-in-Future Work-Up Periods. The
horizontal axis denotes the resulting times (in months) between the end of a maintenance
and the start of the next planned deployment for Shift-Once-in-Future. The vertical axis
denotes the number of observations in each interval. For instance, the leftmost bar shows
that there are twelve work-up periods lasting from 8 to 10 months.
79
Figure D.5 Histogram of the Durations of Shift-All-in-Future Work-Up Periods. The
horizontal axis denotes the resulting times (in months) between the end of a maintenance
and the start of the next planned deployment for Shift-All-in-Future. The vertical axis
denotes the number of observations in each interval. For instance, the leftmost bar shows





ONE-WAY ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE (ANOVA) TEST
1. Hypothesis
: The models do not have an effect on the duration of resulting work-up periods.
: The models have an effect.




= a2 = a3 = a4 = a 5 =
H
,
: Not all a, =
Level of Significance: a =0.05.
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2. Graphical Analysis
Figure D.6 provides the mean and median plot and Figure D.7 provides the box
plot of the work-up period data for each model. According to the graphical analysis, there
are no significant differences between the means, medians, and variances. Therefore,
using precise statistical phrasing, we cannot reject the null hypothesis: "H<>: The models










































Figure D.6. Means and Medians of the Work-Up Period Durations for Base Case
Scenarios Planned with Modified CoRE and GENCoRE. The graph in the left displays
the means, and the other one displays the medians of the resulting the times (in months)
between the end of a maintenance and the start of the next planned deployment. The













Shift-Once Shift-All Modified CoRE Shift-Once-in-Future Shift-All-in -Future
Scenarios
Figure D.7. Box Plots of the Work-Up Period Durations. The graph displays five box plots for each
scenario. The vertical axis shows the resulting the times (in months) between the end of a maintenance
and the start of the next planned deployment. A central box in the graph extends from the first quartile to
the third quartile, so its height equals the interquartile range (IQR). A horizontal line within a box
indicates the median. Vertical lines with close edges extend from each quartile to adjacent values, values
of the last cases not more than 1.5 IQR beyond the quartiles. Farther-out values are called oudiers and are












Because the p-value (smallest value of level of significance that justifies rejection
of the null hypothesis) in the ANOVA table is higher than the level of significance, we
cannot reject our null hypothesis. Therefore, we cannot conclude that planned work-up
periods are affected by our model alterations.
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4. Checking The ANOVA Model Assumptions
ANOVA assumes that the residuals are independent and normally distributed with
equal variance.




















Figure D.8. Diagnostic Plots for the One-Way ANOVA Tests. The upper left graph is a
histogram of the residuals, the upper right is a Quantile-Quantile (QQ) plot of the
residuals, and the lower graph is a residuals-versus-fit plot.
The histogram and the QQ-plot do not strongly support the normal distribution
assumption. However, according to the residuals versus fit plot, we can say that the equal
variance assumption holds. The QQ-plot shows that the residuals are derived from a
positively skewed distribution.
5. Conclusion of the Statistical Analysis
The normality assumption of the residuals is not strongly satisfied. Overlooking
this parametric assumption of homoskedastic normality, we still suggest from the graphed
data summaries that shifting maintenance schedules does not significantly affect the
resulting times between the end of a maintenance and the start of the next deployment.
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APPENDIX E. AN ALTERNATE SET PARTITIONING MODEL
Below is an alternate set partitioning formulation of CoRE. A similar approach
can be used for GENCoRE.
Indices:
c carriers
a AORs (CENTCOM, EUCOM)
t periods (in weeks)
j e J(c) set of possible schedules for each carrier c ( i.e. schedules that satisfy
the operations and maintenance constraints, and provide the period-by-




equals 1 if schedule^' of carrier c covers AOR a in period t, otherwise
WEIGHT weight of coverage in AOR a
Decision Variables (Binary)
y>j equals 1 schedule^' is selected, otherwise
uncovered* equal 1 ifAOR a is not covered in period t, otherwise
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Formulation







+ uncovered" > 1 Vfl, /
«?./
(2)
In the above formulation, the objective is to minimize the uncovered periods
in each AOR. Partition constraint (1) ensures that exactly one schedule is selected for
each carrier. Constraint (2) expresses that each AOR should be covered in each period.
Because this is not feasible for the current carrier force, this constraint is elasticized using
a penalized elastic variable for each uncovered period.
Table E. 1 shows the size of this set partition for a base case twelve-carrier force.
Number of Constraints Number of Binary Variables
Constraint (1) Constraint (2) y Uncovered
14 1,046 222,293 1,046
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